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I. INTRODUCTIONt
The relationship between insurers, the defense counsel they hire to rep-
resent their insureds, and the insureds has been described as a "tripartite" rela-
tionship!l This "eternal triangle" creates a host of ethical issues for all involved
in the defense and representation of insurance policyholders who find them-
selves in the middle of a lawsuit. 2 With the advent and increasing use of billing
and litigation management guidelines, insurers gain more control and trim de-
fense costs in the representation of their insureds. Unfortunately, insureds are
at the mercy of these measures which can result in less effective and restricted
t Copies of all state ethics opinions cited in this note are on file with the West Virginia Law
Review. Most of these opinions, however, can be retrieved from legal databases on the internet.
I Connie Bauswell Saylor, Restrictive Billing Guidelines: The Ethical Problems, FOR THE
DEFENSE, Jan. 1998, at 32.
2 Lawyer Liability in Insurance Defense Practice, in 2001 ATrORNEYS' LIABILITY
ASSURANCE SOCIETY LOSS PREVENTION MANUAL 1 (2001) [hereinafter MANUAL].
3 Andrew G. Cooley, Audits of Attorney Bills, FOR THE DEFENSE, Feb. 1998, at 21.
1
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representation. Furthermore, defense lawyers find themselves in ethical dilem-
mas which could result in violations of the ethics rules and/or no payment for
their services. Finally, the use of billing and litigation directives further con-
fuses the roles of the three actors in the tripartite relationship. The guidelines
foster an atmosphere clouded by inconsistent ethics opinions and scholarly de-
bate, which obscure an already muddled area of legal practice.
This note will address ethics decisions and advisory opinions concern-
ing whether billing and litigation management guidelines violate the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct and/or the relevant ethics code adopted in each
state. The West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary Board, the body responsible for
authoring ethics opinions in West Virginia, has yet to address whether litigation
management guidelines violate the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. How-
ever, the Board has made a decision concerning billing guidelines. This note
argues that billing and litigation management guidelines which interfere with the
independent professional judgment of attorneys and require disclosures of con-
fidential client information inherently violate the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE TRIPARTITE RELATIONSHIP
The tripartite relationship creates a triangle between the insurer, the in-
sured, and the defense attorney. Most insurers retain the ability to control or
influence their insureds' defense by providing legal counsel and paying legal
expenses which result from the attorney's representation of the insured. Lan-
guage in the liability policy between the insured and the insurer often creates an
active role for the insurer in an insured's defense irrespective of whether the
insurer is also considered a client.5 As an active participant, the insurer makes
decisions about issues that arise during litigation including the types of discov-
ery to be undertaken and whether to agree to a settlement.6 While the insurer
remains the decision-maker throughout the litigation, the attorney must also
represent the insured's interests.7 Problems can arise when the insurer and the
lawyer disagree on the proper scope and course of the defense. The American
Bar Association has suggested that an insurance defense counsel has an obliga-
tion to disclose to the insured the nature of the tripartite relationship and any
8limitations in representation that result due to the relationship.




8 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-403 (1996).
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The tripartite relationship also raises an issue concerning which party is
to be considered the client. 9 Determining who the client is helps define and clar-
ify the duties and ethical obligations an attorney owes to the various persons and
entities involved in the tripartite relationship. Historically, the insured and the
insurer were considered dual clients.' 0 Problems created by the eternal triangle
are even more difficult in dual-client states because the attorney must fulfill
ethical obligations to both the insured and the insurer.1
Some jurisdictions have altered the historical dual-client trend. Case
law has redefined the relationship between defense counsel and the insurer by
making defense counsel's primary obligation or duty of loyalty to the insured.'
2
Other states now consider the insured the only client.' 3 West Virginia considers
the insured to be the sole client. 14 Even though the insurance company retains
the lawyer, West Virginia defense counsel must protect the insured's interests as
the sole client in the tripartite relationship. '5 This distinction makes it somewhat
easier to resolve problems created by the eternal triangle.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BILLING AND LITIGATION MANAGEMENT
GUIDELINES
In order to curtail ever-increasing defense costs, insurers have devel-
oped billing guidelines, auditing processes, and litigation management directives
over the years.' 6 The evolution of these cost-cutting and defense management
techniques is important in understanding why billing guidelines and the use of
outside auditors have caused such concern among bar associations. The use of
outside auditors to review legal bills of insurance defense counsel has become
more common within the insurance industry as a way to reduce costs associated
with defense. 17 Beyond controlling and monitoring legal defense costs, insur-
ance companies also have concerns about the possibility of billing fraud.' 8 Out-
side auditors search for billing errors, abuses, and inefficiencies.' 9
9 MANUAL, supra note 2, at 3.
10 Id.
"1 Id. at 4.
12 Id. at 3.
13 Id. at 4.
14 West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., L.E.I. 99-01 (1999).
15 West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., L.E.I. 99-02 (1999).
16 See New Hampshire Ethics Op. 2000-01/05 (2000).
17 See id.
18 Ohio Supreme Court Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2000-2 (2000).
19 Colorado Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107 (1999).
2003]
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Popular wisdom holds that audit procedures have their roots in the
1980s.20 During this time period, "insurance companies received very generous
returns on interest-bearing bonds and other conservative investments.",2' The
22positive financial picture increased demand for defense lawyers. But at the
beginning of the 1990s, conservative interest income dropped sharply, and in-
surance companies were faced with a dilemma.23 The market for insurance be-
came increasingly competitive, making it nearly impossible to raise insurance
24 
2premiums. In addition, claims and legal defense costs continued to increase.25
Insurance companies found that curtailing and controlling legal defense costs
was the easiest way to cut expenses.26 Therefore, billing guidelines began to
creep into the everyday world of insurance defense work.
Until recently, large insurance companies audited lawyers' bills inter-
nally.27 Typically, the claims adjuster would perform the audit.28 The adjuster
would review the bill and ensure that the time spent was reasonably related to
the work the lawyer did.29 In an effort to cut costs, more insurance companies
started using outside auditing companies to review legal bills. 30 Various meth-
ods are used by third-party auditors to review and report their findings.31 Irre-
spective of the methodology used, sending legal bills to an auditing firm for
review only increases the delay between performing legal services and receiving
payment.32
Litigation management guidelines have also been used by insurance
companies as a way to limit the types of services performed by insurance de-
fense counsel.33 Specific examples of litigation management guidelines are
treated under a separate section of this note. For now, it is important to realize
that litigation management guidelines can impose unreasonable restraints on











31 See Colorado Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107 (1999).
32 Cooley, supra note 3, at 22.
33 See MANUAL, supra note 2, at 11.
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insurance defense counsel in the conduct of litigation, which could prejudice the
insured's interests. 34
IV. APPLICABLE ETHICS RULES
Billing and litigation management guidelines create dilemmas that im-
plicate a host of ethical rules for insurance defense counsel. Many states have
adopted the American Bar Association ("ABA") Model Rules of Professional
Conduct either in an identical format or in one very similar.35 In addition, com-
parable provisions to the Model Rules exist in the ABA Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility for those states still using the Model Code in identical or
similar versions.36 This discussion will focus on the ABA Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct since they generally establish the basis for state ethics
codes.37 In relation to billing and litigation management directives, the relevant
rules which most often raise concerns in the tripartite relationship between the
insured, insurer, and lawyer can be limited to the following four: ABA Model
Rule 1.6, ABA Model Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rule 1.8, and ABA Model Rule
54.38
Confidentiality issues raised by the subject are often resolved by apply-
ing ABA Model Rule 1.6 - Confidentiality of Information.39 Subsection (a) of
this rule states, "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation
of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures
that are impliedly authorized in order to carry on the representation, and except
as stated in paragraph (b)." 40 The comparable Model Code provision is con-
tained in DR 4-101 .4 1 This rule covers a wide array of information obtained by
a lawyer about a client and his or her case,42 providing much broader protection
than the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.4 3 A lawyer
cannot disclose this information unless such disclosure is authorized by the
Rules of Professional Conduct or another law.44 This rule is particularly appli-
34 Id.
35 Id. at 9.
36 See id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 9-10.
39 MODEL RULES OF PROF' L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2000).
40 Id. R. 1.6(a).
41 MODEL CODE OF PROF' L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1981).
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cable to insurers' requests to defense counsel to submit bills directly to outside
auditors.
Depending upon the jurisdiction in which one practices, the insurer in
the tripartite relationship could either be considered a dual client or a third party
payor.45 Either situation raises the potential for inherent conflict. Conflicts of
interest are mainly attributable to the duties of diligence, loyalty, confidentiality,
and faithfulness to client objectives owed by lawyers to clients. 46 Model Rule
1.7 prohibits conflicts of interest. 47 Subsection (b) of this rule states:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities
to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own in-
terests, unless (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representa-
tion will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents
after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in a
single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include ex-
planation of the implications of the common representation and
the advantages and risks involved.48
Conflicts of interest commonly occur whether the insurer is considered a client
under the dual representation doctrine or merely a third party payor; thus, Rule
1.7(b) is applicable in either situation.4
The rule's relevancy is evident. It covers situations in which the law-
yer's representation of the client could be affected by his responsibilities to the
insurer resulting in a conflict of interest. For example, an Iowa ethics opinion
listed sample litigation management guidelines which permitted a non-lawyer
claims representative to perform tasks traditionally performed by a lawyer.50 An
attorney in this situation has a conflict of interest that threatens the relationship
with his or her client and the insurer/employer. Allowing a claims representa-
tive to perform legal tasks could undermine and jeopardize an attorney's compe-
tent advocacy and his or her duty of loyalty to the client. On the other hand,
refusing to cooperate with the insurer could result in a denial of payment for
services rendered.
Two rules found in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct address
potential disputes between insurers and defense counsel. First, Rule 1.8 regu-
45 MANUAL, supra note 2, at 3-4.
46 Thomas D. Morgan, What Insurance Scholars Should Know About Professional Responsi-
bility, 4 CONN. INs. L.J. 1, 4 (1997/1998).
47 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2000).
48 Id. R. 1.7(a).
49 Morgan, supra note 46, at 5.
50 Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Ethics and Conduct, Op. 99-1 (1999)
[Vol. 105
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lates prohibited transactions when conflicts of interest are involved.5' The per-
tinent section states:
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client
from one other than the client unless: (1) the client consents af-
ter consultation; (2) there is not interference with the lawyer's
independence of professional judgment or with the client-
lawyer relationship; and (3) information relating to the
representation of a client is protected as required by rule 1.6.52
Regarding billing and litigation management guidelines, Rule 1.8 encompasses
both client confidentiality issues and the lawyer's exercise of independent pro-
fessional judgment.53 The rule is especially relevant because insurance compa-
nies typically pay defense counsels' fees on their insureds' behalf.
Second, Rule 5.4 deals with the professional judgment of a lawyer.
Subsection (c) states, "A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends,
employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regu-
late the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering legal services. 54 Given
that insurers retain lawyers to defend their insureds and pay the legal costs asso-
ciated with that representation, the relationship between defense counsel and
insurers is covered by this rule. Through the use of billing and litigation man-
agement guidelines, the insurer attempts to exert indirect control over the inde-
pendent professional judgment of defense counsel.55 Since the insurer deter-
mines which legal services will be paid, the attorney allows the insurer a meas-
ure of control over the representation. 56 Tense situations can arise when an at-
torney feels pressured to forgo undertaking certain legal services, which he or
she feels are necessary for an effective representation of the insured-client, sim-
ply because compensation is not guaranteed for that type of legal work.57 These
circumstances reduce legal expenditures at the cost of ineffective and inappro-
priately limited representation. Therefore, insurers should not interfere with a
lawyer's professional judgment by giving directives which would regulate or
interfere with such judgment.
The four Model Rules of Professional Conduct outlined above are those
most frequently cited in the various ethics opinions relating to billing and litiga-
tion management guidelines. They provide guidance in determining what ethical
51 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8.
52 Id. R. 1.8(f).
53 Id.
54 Id. R. 5.4(c).
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responsibilities defense counsel owes to the client and the insurer. More impor-
tantly, they help to answer the question of whether or not the guidelines them-
selves are a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
V. BILLING GUIDELINES AND OUTSIDE AUDITORS
Over thirty states have issued ethical opinions relating to billing guide-
lines and the submission of legal billing statements to outside auditors.58 These
opinions cover many issues raised by billing guidelines and the review of legal
bills by outside auditing companies. Some of the more common billing guide-
lines have been used as examples in the ethics opinions on the subject.
59
Once insurance carriers have established billing guidelines, they fre-
quently hire either internal or external auditors to review legal bills to ensure
that defense counsel has complied with the mandated billing directives. 60 The
level of detail required by these billing guidelines can be very extensive. "Iden-
tity of participants, the content of all communications (telephone calls, corre-
spondence, meetings), specific issues researched, the specific trial preparation
performed, and the identity of material or documents reviewed and written work
58 Alabama Ethics Op. RO-98-02 (1998); Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 99-1
(1999); Arizona State Bar Comm. on the Rules of Prof l Conduct, Formal Op. 99-08 (1999);
Colorado Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107 (1999); Connecticut Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Prof'I Ethics, Informal Op. 00-20 (2000); District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 290
(1999); Florida Bar Staff Op. 20762 (1998); Georgia State Bar Proposed Advisory Op. 99-R2
(2000); Hawaii Formal Ethics Comm., Op. 36 (1999); Idaho State Bar Formal Ethics Op. 136
(1999); Indiana State Bar Op. 4 (1998); Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Ethics and Conduct, Op. 99-1
(1999); Kentucky Advisory Ethics Op. KBA E-404 (1998); Louisiana Bar Ethics 45 La. B.J. 438
(1998); Maine Bar Ass'n Ethics Op. 164 (1998); Maryland State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op.
99-7 (1998); Massachusetts Bar Ethics Op. 2000-4 (2000); Mississippi State Bar Ass'n Op. 246
(1999); Missouri Informal Op. Summary 980188 (1998); In re Rules of Prof'l Conduct and In-
surer Imposed Billing Rules and Procedures, 2 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2000); Nebraska Advisory
Comm., Advisory Op. 00-1 (2000); New Hampshire Ethics Op. 2000-02/05 (2000); New Mexico
State Bar Formal Advisory Op. 2000-02 (2000); New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l
Ethics, Op. 716 (1998); North Carolina State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 11 (2000); Ohio Supreme
Court Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2000-2 (2000); Oklahoma Bar Ass'n
Legal Ethics Comm., Proposed Revised Advisory Op. 1998-04 (1998); Oregon Formal Op. 1999-
157 (1999); Pennsylvania Informal Op. 97-119 (1997); Rhode Island Supreme Court Ethics Advi-
sory Panel, Op. 99-17 (1999); South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Op. 98-36 (1998); State Bar of
South Dakota Ethics Op. 99-2 (1999); Tennessee Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility,
Formal Ethics Op. 99-F-143 (1999); Texas Ethics Op. 532 (2000); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory
Op. Comm., Op. 98-03 (1998); Vermont Bar Ass'n Ethics Op. 98-7 (1998); Virginia Bar Legal
Ethics Op. LEO 1723 (1998); Washington State Bar Ass'n Formal Op. 195 (1999); West Virginia
Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., L.E.I. 99-02 (1999); Wisconsin State Bar Prof I Ethics Comm., Ethics
Op. E-99-1 (1999).
59 District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 290; Indiana State Bar Op. 4; Iowa
Supreme Court Bd. of Ethics and Conduct, Op. 99-1; Rhode Island Supreme Court Ethics Advi-
sory Panel, Op. 99-17; Vermont Bar Ass'n Ethics Op. 98-7; Virginia Bar Legal Ethics Op. LEO
1723.
60 New Hampshire Ethics Op. 2000-02/05.
[Vol. 105
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product generated in the representation of the client" are all examples of billing
61guideline requirements.
Billing guidelines can influence the attorney's personal judgment about
what is best for the client. Lawyers may be discouraged or even prohibited from
pursuing courses of action beneficial to the insured. Attorneys threatened with
receiving no compensation for certain legal services could be deterred from per-
forming appropriate legal tasks for their client. Financial disincentives resulting
from restrictive billing guidelines only serve to create additional ethical dilem-
mas for attorneys.
Moreover, billing guidelines set the stage for a conflict of interest by
threatening the duty of loyalty owed to the client as mandated by ABA Rule
1.7 .62 Short-term economic incentives and self-interest compel the attorney to
continue to accept work from the insurance company even if it mandates certain
billing requirements which could compromise his or her duty of loyalty to the
client. Refusal to abide by restrictive guidelines and requests for outside audit-
ing of legal bills will result in a loss of business from the insurer that can be a
lucrative source of income.63 If a failure to take the best course of action results
in an adverse effect to the client, the attorney has violated the ethical standards
of Rule 1.7.64 Neither option is appealing or viable for defense counsel, and
billing guidelines should not place an attorney in a position that requires the
lawyer to choose between compensation and ethical behavior toward clients.
Outside auditors often have the authority to determine those services for
which attorneys should be paid and which legal costs should be denied.65 Audi-
tors can also make downward adjustments in the legal bill.66 When a dispute
arises over whether a certain legal service will be compensated, the auditor often
requests supplemental information from the attorney to justify the time spent or
the service performed. 67 For example, supplemental materials requested have
included
[s]pecific descriptions of work performed, settlement offers,
and estimates of the insured's percentage of liability. Specifi-
cally the auditing agency has requested such items as the iden-
tity of participants, as well as the substance of a variety of
61 District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 290.
62 Saylor, supra note 1, at 33.
63 Id. (explaining how human self-interest and short-term economic incentives combine to
pressure attorneys into continuing to accept insurance defense work and abiding by billing guide-
lines because the firms need the business).
64 Id.
65 Ohio Supreme Court Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2000-2.
66 Cooley, supra note 3, at 22.
67 New Hampshire Ethics Op. 2000-02/05.
2003]
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communications, specific issues researched, the identity of ma-
terials and documents reviewed, specific trial preparation per-
formed and specific non-deposition discovery.68
Providing this type of detailed information puts legal counsel in an ethical di-
lemma given an attorney's duty to keep information related to representation of
clients confidential. 69 Billing statements inevitably contain information relating
to the representation of clients; thus, the attorney must either avoid giving bill-
ing statements to outside auditors or find a way to abide by the ethical rules and
insurance carrier billing guidelines. Ethics committees have provided advice
and guidance in resolving this problem.7°
A majority of state ethics governing bodies have opined that defense
counsel may not reveal confidential client information through submission of
legal bills to an outside auditor without consent of the insured-client, who must
71be informed by consultation with the lawyer. Within this general consensus,
several important concerns and problems have been addressed. First, the feasi-
bility of obtaining fully informed consent to reveal confidential client informa-
tion is a potential problem.72 State ethics opinions are not consistent when sug-
gesting factors to be discussed with insureds or in recommending which process
may be best in obtaining fully informed consent.73
68 Maryland State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 99-7 (1998).
69 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2000).
70 See supra note 58.
71 Alabama Ethics Op. RO-98-02; Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 99-1; Arizona
State Bar Comm. on the Rules of Prof'I Conduct, Formal Op. 99-08; Connecticut Bar Ass'n
Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Informal Op. 00-20; District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op.
290; Indiana State Bar Op. 4; Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Ethics and Conduct, Op. 99-1; Ken-
tucky Advisory Ethics Op. KBA E-404; Maryland State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 99-7;
Massachusetts Bar Ethics Op. 2000-4; Mississippi State Bar Ass'n Op. 246; In re Rules of Prof'I
Conduct and Insurer Imposed Billing Rules and Procedures, 2 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2000); Nebraska
Advisory Comm., Advisory Op. 00-1; New Hampshire Ethics Op. 2000-02/05; New York State
Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 716; North Carolina State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 11;
Ohio Supreme Court Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2000-2; Oregon Formal
Op. 1999-157; Rhode Island Supreme Court Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 99-17; South Carolina
Bar Ethics Advisory Op. 98-36; State Bar of South Dakota Ethics Op. 99-2; Tennessee Supreme
Court Bd. of Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 99-F-143; Texas Ethics Op. 532; Utah State
Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 98-03; Vermont Bar Ass'n Ethics Op. 98-7; Virginia Bar
Legal Ethics Op. LEO 1723; Washington State Bar Ass'n Formal Op. 195; West Virginia Lawyer
Disciplinary Bd., L.E.I. 99-02; Wisconsin State Bar Prof'I Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. E-99-1.
72 District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 290.
73 New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Op. 716; North Carolina Proposed
Formal Ethics Op. 10 (1998); Rhode Island Supreme Court Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 99-17;
Tennessee Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 99-F-143.
[Vol. 105
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For those states using a version of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, the consultation issue is fairly straightforward.7 4 Consultation is de-
fined as "communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the cli-
ent to appreciate the significance of the matter in question. 75 To meet the re-
quirements of this definition, states have proposed different factors for discus-
sion with the client to ensure that all the proper information is conveyed.7 6 New
York directs attorneys to discuss the nature of the information found in billing
records and relevant legal and nonlegal consequences of the client's decision,
including the extent of the client's obligation under the insurance contract and
the possibility that the insurance company might refuse to indemnify the cli-
ent.77 In Tennessee, defense counsel must notify the client of the disclosure
request, provide the client with a list of all the advantages and disadvantages of
disclosure, allow the client to seek independent legal advice, and permit access
to the information only after the client gives consent.78 Rhode Island provides
that the lawyer "must adequately and fairly identify the effects of disclosure and
non-disclosure on the client's interests., 79 Lawyers practicing in different juris-
dictions should be aware of the varied techniques and processes proposed by
each state to deal with the disclosure issue.
Several opinions have cautioned defense counsel that the insurance pol-
icy between the insured and the insurer, the contract between the lawyer and the
insurer, or any blanket provision between the insured and the insurer are insuffi-
cient to constitute consent.80 These opinions require an attorney to review and
renew the consent afforded by these documents.8 1 Consent can also become a
continuing obligation if situations arise that were not originally discussed or
covered in the prior fully informed consent agreement.
82
74 Rhode Island Supreme Court Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 99-17.
75 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT TERMINOLOGY SECTION (2000).
76 See supra note 73.
77 New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Op. 716 (1998).
78 Tennessee Supreme Court Bd. of Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 99-F-143 (1999).
79 Rhode Island Supreme Court Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 99-17.
80 District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 290 (1999); Indiana State Bar Op. 4
(1998); New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Op. 716; Rhode Island Supreme
Court Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 99-17; State Bar of South Dakota Ethics Op. 99-2 (1999); Ten-
nessee Supreme Court Bd. of Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 99-F-143; Utah State Bar
Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 98-03 (1998); West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., L.E.I.
99-02 (1999).
81 District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 290; New York State Bar Ass'n Comm.
on Prof'I Ethics, Op. 716; Rhode Island Supreme Court Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 99-17; State
Bar of South Dakota Ethics Op. 99-2; Tennessee Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'I Responsibility,
Formal Ethics Op. 99-F-143; Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 98-03; West Vir-
ginia Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., L.E.I. 99-02.
82 New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 716; West Virginia Lawyer Disci-
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Requiring attorneys to review and renew consent recognizes the reality
that many insureds do not know what is contained in the fine print of their in-
surance policies. Insurance contracts have often been characterized as contracts
of adhesion because the insured does not have an opportunity to negotiate the
terms.83 The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity states the dilemma succinctly: "[W]e cannot assume that the insured under-
stands or remembers, if he ever read, the insurance policy, or that the insured
understands that his lawyer will be acting on his behalf, but at the direction of
the insurer without further consultation with the insured." 84 While the insurance
contract may disclose the duties between the insured and the insurer, it does not
define the ethical responsibilities that the lawyer has to his client.85 Therefore,
the attorney owes a responsibility not only to his client, but also to himself, to
adequately convey the appropriate information in obtaining consent and explain-
ing the limitations on his representation.
A troubling and critical issue regarding the disclosure of confidential in-
formation is the possibility of waiver of the attorney-client privilege and/or the
work product doctrine. 86 While ethics advisory boards are unable to decide this
legal question, which is reserved for the courts, several state opinions include
dire warnings to defense counsel about the potential waiver problem.87 One
fairly recent case has caused commentators and defense attorneys to pay consid-
erable attention to the negative and unintended ramifications of disclosing in-
formation to outside auditors.
88
In United States v. MIT,89 a First Circuit Court of Appeals case decided
in 1997, the court held that privileged information given to government auditors
was indeed discoverable. 90 MIT waived the attorney-client privilege when it
disclosed documents to government auditors, which the court considered outside
the magic circle of others to which the privilege applies.9' The court deemed the
government audit agency to be a potential adversary in the event that controver-
sies over disputed bills could lead to litigation between MIT and the auditors.92
plinary Bd., L.E.I. 99-02.
83 MANUAL, supra note 2, at 10.
84 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-403 (1996).
85 Id.
86 See supra note 7 1.
87 See id.
88 See United States v. MIT, 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997).
89 Id.
90 See id.
91 Id. at 684.
92 Id. at 687.
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Disclosure to auditors was construed as disclosure to an adversary, thereby for-
feiting the work product protection.
93
If other courts begin to hand down similar opinions, insureds, insurers,
and defense counsel will find themselves in an unenviable position. Submitting
bills to outside auditors is frequently required without the knowledge and/or
consent of insureds. If these disclosures waive the attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrine protections, other parties could discover information
about the insured's case. In MIT, the court did note that a strong policy argu-
ment could be made for protecting against disclosure of the mental impressions
and legal theories of an attorney.94 However, it refused to consider the issue
because it was not raised or briefed for the court's review.95 Any attorney fac-
ing litigation concerning disclosures to auditors and the possible consequences
of those disclosures would be wise to make the argument; however, it may not
prevent those documents from becoming discoverable.
In obtaining consent for disclosure from the client, defense counsel
should explain the potential waiver issue that could arise by disclosing legal
bills and documents to outside auditors. Furthermore, attorneys may want to
persuade insurance carriers to reconsider their outside auditing practices in light
of the MIT ruling, If the insurance carrier insists on sending bills to outside
auditors, lawyers may want to clearly mark all documents as "'Privileged and/or
Confidential, for internal use only.'
96
A final concern about the use of outside auditors relates to the ancillary
uses of the cost information being provided for review. One ethics opinion
noted that some auditing firms were building databases from billing information
to serve other interests.97 Some auditing companies have even required attor-
neys to buy billing software and send the computerized information to the out-
side auditing firm.98 Lawyers have conjectured that the information is being
used to create a national database that itemizes the lawyer's tasks and assigns an
average charge to those tasks. 99
Disclosure of legal invoices to outside auditors for compliance with bill-
ing guidelines can cause ethical dilemmas for defense counsel. It is recom-
mended that attorneys become familiar with the applicable ethics opinions and
the guidance they provide. Following the procedures set out in these opinions
may help defense counsel if their motivations and disclosure processes are ques-
tioned.
93 Id. at 681.
94 Id. at 688.
95 Id.
96 Colorado Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107 (1999).
97 Kentucky Advisory Ethics Op. KBA E-404 (1998).
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VI. LITIGATION MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES
Two dozen states have issued ethical opinions relating to the use of liti-
gation management guidelines or billing guidelines that place substantive re-
straints on the provision of certain legal services.' °° Various litigation manage-
ment guidelines have been used as representative samples in the ethics opinions
on the subject. Some sample guidelines/restrictions include: (1) identifying all
witnesses interviewed and experts consulted as well as the subject matter dis-
cussed; 10' (2) discouraging the use of paralegals in favor of less qualified outside
vendors to perform tasks, discouraging the use of more experienced and costly
personnel in preliminary research, refusing to pay for computerized legal re-
search while discouraging extensive manual research to replace it, forbidding
summarizing depositions, mandating deferral of trial preparation until trial is
imminent, and refusing to pay for proofreading or revisions of first drafts of any
written materials to produce a final product of suitable quality;10 2 (3) controlling
how a law firm staffs a file, providing that a non-lawyer claims representative
can perform tasks traditionally performed by a lawyer, requiring lawyers to rely
upon unsupervised legal research, requiring prior approval for depositions or
pleadings, curtailing interoffice meetings of lawyers working on files, limiting
written communication with the insured-client, dictating use and type of discov-
ery; 10 3 and (4) requirmng pre-approval for time spent on research, travel, and the
taking of depositions.1°4 Given the breadth of these example restrictions, one
cannot deny that they have a profound impact on the lawyer's planning and
preparation of an insured's defense.
The state ethics opinions are divided into four categories, characterized
by their treatment of litigation management guidelines in relation to the Model
100 Alabama Ethics Op. RO-98-02 (1998); Arizona State Bar Comm. on the Rules of Prof'l
Conduct, Formal Op. 99-08 (1999); Colorado Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107; Florida
Ethics Op. 97-1 (1997); Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Advisory Op. on Prof'l Conduct 98-08 (1998);
Indiana State Bar Op. 3 (1998); Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Ethics and Conduct, Op. 99-1 (1999);
Kentucky Ethics Op. KBA E-416 (1998); Michigan Ethics Op. RI-293 (1997); Mississippi State
Bar Ass'n Op. 211 (1993); Missouri Informal Op. 980188 (1998); In re Rules of Prof I Conduct
and Insurer Imposed Billing Rules and Procedures, 2 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2000); Nebraska Advisory
Comm., Advisory Op. 00-1 (2000); North Carolina Proposed Formal Ethics Op. 17 (1998); Ohio
Supreme Court Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2000-3 (2000); Oregon For-
mal Op. 2002-166 (2002); Rhode Island Supreme Court Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 99-18 (1999);
Tennessee Supreme Court Bd. of Prof I Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 2000-F-145 (2000);
Texas Ethics Op. 533 (2000); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 02-03 (2002);
Vermont Bar Ass'n Ethics Op. 98-7 (1998); Virginia Bar Legal Ethics Op. LEO 1723 (1998);
Washington State Bar Ass'n Formal Op. 195 (1999); Wisconsin State Bar Prof 1 Ethics Comm.,
Ethics Op. E-99-1 (1999).
10t Indiana State Bar Op. 4 (1998).
102 Vermont Bar Ass'n Ethics Op. 98-7.
103 Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Ethics and Conduct, Op. 99-1.
104 Virginia Bar Legal Ethics Op. LEO 1723.
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Rules of Professional Conduct. Nine states determined that the guidelines in-
herently violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.10 5 These states held that
defense lawyers cannot ethically abide by programs that direct, regulate, or re-
strict the counsel's independent professional judgment.'06
Kentucky, Michigan, and Washington also held that lawyers may not
comply with litigation management guidelines that interfere with the exercise of
independent professional judgment.'°7 However, the opinions also provided that
clients may consent to limitations imposed on the representation after receiving
full disclosure and consulting with the lawyer. 0 8 In addition, six states opined
that defense counsel may follow any litigation management guidelines if the
client gives fully informed consent after disclosure of the possible risks and im-
plications of the limitations.'°9
Finally, seven states held that, while litigation management guidelines
may often interfere with the exercise of independent professional judgment, they
are not a per se violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct."0 These states
proposed a case-by-case analysis of how the guidelines may affect the represen-
tation. 1' Unfortunately, these opinions offered no practical solution or resolu-
tion to the problem and continued to place defense counsel in ethical dilemmas.
Once a lawyer finds him/herself in a conflict of interest situation or facing a
potential ethical breach, the opinions merely suggested that the attorney may
have to withdraw.'" 2 This course of action has negative consequences for all
parties involved in the tripartite relationship.
105 Arizona State Bar Comm. on the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Formal Op. 99-08; Colorado Bar
Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107; Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Ethics and Conduct, Op. 99-1;
Mississippi State Bar Ass'n Op. 211; In re Rules of Prof'l Conduct and Insurer Imposed Billing
Rules and Procedures, 2 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2000); Nebraska Advisory Comm., Advisory Op. 00-1;
Ohio Supreme Court Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2000-3; Rhode Island
Supreme Court Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 99-18; Texas Ethics Op. 533.
106 See supra note 105.
107 Kentucky Ethics Op. KBA E-416; Michigan Ethics Op. RI-293; Washington State Bar
Ass'n Formal Op. 195.
108 See supra note 107.
109 Missouri Informal Op. 980188; Mississippi State Bar Ass'n Op. 211; North Carolina Pro-
posed Formal Ethics Op. 17; Tennessee Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Eth-
ics Op. 2000-F-145; Vermont Bar Ass'n Ethics Op. 98-7; Virginia Bar Legal Ethics Op. LEO
1723.
110 Alabama Ethics Op. RO-98-02; Florida Ethics Op. 97-1; Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Advisory
Op. on Prof'l Conduct 98-08; Indiana State Bar Op. 3; Oregon Formal Op. 2002-166; Utah State
Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 02-03; Wisconsin State Bar Prof'l Ethics Comm., Ethics
Op. E-99-1.
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VII. IN RE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND INSURER IMPOSED BILLING
RULES AND PROCEDURES"3
To date, the Montana Supreme Court has been the only state supreme
court to decide whether disclosure of legal bills to third-party auditors and other
litigation management guidelines violate the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct. The Montana Supreme Court held that "defense counsel in Montana who
submit to the requirement of prior approval violate their duties under the Rules
of Professional Conduct to exercise their independent judgment and to give their
undivided loyalty to insureds."' 14 In addition, defense counsel may not submit
detailed descriptions of professional services to third-party auditors without first
obtaining the contemporaneous fully informed consent of insureds." 5 If an at-
torney does not obtain the appropriate consent before disclosing legal bills to
outside auditors for review, he or she has violated the rules of client confidenti-
ality under the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct (based on the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct).16
A. Factual Background and Procedural History
In November of 1998, petitioners filed an application with the court for
original jurisdiction and declaratory relief." 7 The petitioners argued that insurer
billing guidelines and practice rules violated the Montana Rules of Professional
Conduct because they imposed conditions limiting or directing the scope and
extent of the representation of clients and required submission of detailed legal
bills to outside auditors without first obtaining consent from the insured-
client." 8 The court reviewed over 1000 pages of billing guidelines and practice
rules from different insurers practicing in Montana, read numerous amici briefs
and expert opinions, and heard oral arguments before coming to a conclusion in
April of 2000."9
B. Litigation Management Guidelines
The first issue concerned billing and practice rules that limited or di-
rected the scope and extent of the representation prepared for insureds.120 The
113 2 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2000).
114 Id. at 817.
115 Id. at 822.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 808.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 808-09.
120 Id. at 809.
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court set out several Montana Rules of Professional Conduct that were relevant
to the issue, including Rule 1.1 regarding competence, Rule 1.8 prohibiting con-
flicts of interest, and Rules 2.1 and 5.4, which mandate the exercise of inde-
pendent professional judgment.12' It used a representative set of guidelines
submitted by the St. Paul Companies, which initiate a "team approach" to the
defense of an insured between the claim professional assigned to the case and
the defense attorney hired to represent the insured. 122 The claim professional
played a substantial role in the defense including initiating settlement negotia-
tions and having input into development of the litigation strategy. 23 Particu-
larly worrisome were guidelines that required defense counsel to obtain prior
approval from the claim professional before an attorney could schedule deposi-
tions, conduct research, employ experts, and write motions. 1
24
Respondent insurers argued that, as co-clients of defense counsel, they
were entitled to require pre-approval of attorney activities. 25 The court held
that respondents misconstrued past Montana decisions to support their argument
regarding co-client status of insurers. 26 It concluded that the insured is the sole
client of defense counsel and any contractual relationship existing between an
insured and an insurer does not supersede or waive the defense attorney's ethical
obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct. 127 Therefore, practice
rules requiring prior approval fundamentally interfere with the exercise of inde-
pendent judgment as required by Rule 1.8 and create a "substantial appearance
of impropriety in its suggestion that it is insurers rather than defense counsel
who control the day to day details of a defense.'
28
The Montana Supreme Court briefly described several other state opin-
ions that rejected similar arrangements which hindered attorneys' undivided
duty of loyalty to their clients and interfered with attorneys' independent profes-
sional judgment. 29 While not entirely on point factually, these other cases con-
cerned similar issues and directives from insurers, thus supporting Montana's
decision.




124 Id. at 810.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 814.
128 ld. at 815.
129 Id. at 815-17.
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C Use of Outside Auditors and Billing Guidelines
The court then turned to the issue of outside auditors and whether sub-
mitting detailed descriptions of professional services to third-party auditors
without first obtaining informed consent of the client violated client confidenti-
ality. 3 ° Rule 1.6 (regarding client confidentiality) was set out by the court as a
guiding principle in the decision. 131 Again, a representative set of billing guide-
lines from Zurich-American Insurance Group was used to demonstrate typical
auditing conditions imposed on defense counsel.
32
Petitioners argued that lawyers abiding by the billing rules would have
to disclose confidential detailed descriptions of professional services to auditors
which would not advance the representation of insureds.133 In addition, peti-
tioners posited that third-party auditors did not fall within a protective "magic
circle" and disclosures of billing statements to outside auditors could only be
made with informed consent of the client after consultation.
34
Respondents countered that third-party auditors act as agents of insurers
and share a common interest in reducing the costs of litigation, which makes
them part of the privileged community. Furthermore, respondents argued that
insureds' consent was implied for disclosures reasonably necessary for represen-
tation and that insureds consented to disclosure in the insurance contract.1 35 The
court concluded that third-party auditors did not fall within the magic circle or
community of interest that was recognized in United States v. MIT. 36 It also
held that disclosure of detailed billing statements to outside auditors constituted
disclosure to a potential adversary because the possibility of disputes between
defense counsel and auditors could potentially result in litigation. 37 It rejected
both arguments by respondents about consent by contract and by implied au-
thorization.
38
To allow disclosures of detailed professional billing statements and
avoid violations of client confidentiality, the court mandated that attorneys ob-
tain fully informed consent from insureds.139 In describing this consent, the







136 Id. at 820 (citing United States v. MIT, 129 F.3d 681 (lst Cir. 1997)).
137 Id. at 821.
138 Id. at 821-22.
139 Id. at 822.
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court stated, "the consent must be contemporaneous with the facts and circum-
stances of which the insured should be aware." 4° Obtaining this type of fully
informed consent would then prevent violations of the Montana Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.
VIII. ADVICE FOR WEST VIRGINIA DEFENSE COUNSEL
While it has not yet reached an opinion as to whether litigation man-
agement guidelines violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, the West Virginia
Lawyer Disciplinary Board has rendered an opinion on billing guidelines and
submissions of legal bills to outside auditors.' 4' West Virginia has already pro-
posed the same type of consent required by the Montana Supreme Court in deal-
ing with billing practices and the use of outside auditors.1
42
Defense counsel in West Virginia and the West Virginia Lawyer Disci-
plinary Board should take a close look at Montana's ruling. Attorneys should
not be faced with a choice that potentially advocates ethical violations and in-
adequate representation of clients in order to secure a paycheck from insurance
companies. This type of conflict of interest will only serve to strain relations
between insureds, defense counsel, and insurers in the eternal triangle.
Montana's ruling recognizes that billing and litigation management
guidelines which interfere with the independent professional judgment of attor-
neys and require disclosures of confidential client information inherently violate
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. If the West Virginia Lawyer Disci-
plinary Board would take a similar stance, defense counsel would be relieved
from making what is truly an impossible decision. Insurers do have legitimate
business concerns in trying to reduce the costs of legal representation. How-
ever, cost-cutting techniques cannot be employed if they encourage unethical
behavior and ineffective assistance of counsel.
Options proposed by other state ethics boards are unsatisfactory.143 Re-
quiring an attorney to perform necessary legal service without compensation is
an unfair and unrealistic financial disincentive to zealous representation. Seek-
ing payment for services from the insured-client is equally problematic. Insur-
eds may be financially unable to pay for the cost of a deposition or other legal
task for which the insurer refuses to pay. Insureds have paid insurance premi-
ums which should offset some costs of legal representation. Texas Supreme
Court Justice Gonzalez addressed the representation issue when he stated,
140 Id.
141 West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., L.E.I. 99-02 (1999).
142 Id.
143 Alabama Ethics Op. RO-98-02 (1998); Florida Ethics Op. 97-1 (1997); Illinois State Bar
Ass'n, Advisory Op. on Prof'l Conduct 98-08 (1998); Indiana State Bar Op. 3 (1998); Wisconsin
State Bar Prof'l Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. E-99-1 (1999).
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Whether insureds are getting the value and the level of repre-
sentation they are paying for deserves serious, thorough study.
I do not mean to imply that all insureds are entitled to a "Cadil-
lac" defense when all they paid for is a "Chevrolet." My con-
cern, however, is that because of recent market changes in in-
surance defense practice, some insureds who have paid for a
"Chevrolet" defense are getting a "Yugo" defense.
144
Other states have proposed that attorneys withdraw from representation
if a situation presents itself where the attorney cannot ethically abide by billing
or litigation management guidelines. 145 Unfortunately, proposing withdrawal is
easier said than done, given that most withdrawals must be approved by the
court. A more feasible alternative would require lawyers to negotiate with in-
surance companies over the application of litigation management and billing
guidelines where compliance would mean breaching the ethics rules. In these
situations, attorneys may seek a modification of the guidelines. However, if an
agreement cannot be reached, attorneys still face the possibility of withdrawal
from representation.
IX. CONCLUSION
Billing and litigation management guidelines will continue to be a
source of dispute and scholarly debate. Insurers' cost-cutting techniques put the
insureds' defenses at several disadvantages. In deterring beneficial legal ser-
vices, billing restrictions reduce the effectiveness of the defense. Also, mandat-
ing the use of outside auditors could jeopardize the confidentiality of client in-
formation. Third-party review has the potential to waive the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine. The most troubling aspect of the situation
is that frequently insureds have no idea about what billing or litigation manage-
ment guidelines control their representation. Damage is being done without the
consent or knowledge of a majority of insureds. In summary, billing and litiga-
tion management guidelines which interfere with the independent professional
judgment of attorneys and require disclosures of confidential client information
inherently violate the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Attorneys should become familiar with the applicable ethics opinions in
the state in which they practice. If defense lawyers abide by the restrictions and
directives set out by insurers, they must still practice within the parameters of
the applicable ethics rules. Difficulties in resolving the two will no doubt
abound, but the attorney's first duty is to perform his or her duties in a manner
144 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d 625, 634 (Tex. 1998).
145 See supra note 143.
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that complies with the ethical obligations laid down by the state governing
board. As succinctly stated by Justice Reid of the Supreme Court of Tennessee,
The loyalty and independent judgment required by the Code are
absolute. They are essential to the integrity and accountability
of the profession and the legal system. If the cost of legal rep-
resentation is burdensome .... the profession must look to re-
forms which do not threaten the foundation of the profession
and the system of justice.
1 46
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146 In re Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d 322, 329 (Tenn. 1995).
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